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Internet Activism 
& the Party-State in China
Guobin Yang
GUOBIN YANG is Associate Pro-
fessor of Sociology and Commu-
nication in the Annenberg School
for Communication and the De -
partment of Sociology at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. His publi-
cations include The Power of the
Internet in China: Citizen Activism
Online (2009), Re-Envisioning the
Chinese Revolution: The Politics and
Poetics of Collective Memories in Re -
form China (edited with Ching Kwan
Lee, 2007), and China’s Red Guard
Generation: Loyalty, Dissent, and
Nostalgia, 1966–1999 (forthcoming,
Columbia University Press).
Internet activism is one of the most important
forms of citizen activism in China. It refers broadly
to claims-making contentious activities associated
with the use of the Internet; and its vitality in China
derives from its diverse forms, ranging from oppo-
sitional dissidence to cooperative community action.
First appearing in the mid-1990s, when Internet
penetration was still low, Internet activism has
since gathered great momentum and currency. The
Chinese party-state initially reacted to it with alarm;
but over the years, the party-state has cultivated an
approach that combines repressive policing with
gentler methods of social management. And far
from being static or monolithic, the Chinese Internet
control system has evolved in response to changing
forms of Internet activism. Meanwhile, Internet ac -
tivism has itself evolved in response to the new
forms of state control. The resilience and adapt-
ability of Internet activism have ensured that the
movement will continue to grow despite state ef -
forts to disrupt it. 
This story of mutual adaptation is rooted in deep
structural and institutional conditions. Internet ac -
© 2014 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences
doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00276
Abstract: The history of Internet activism and Internet control in China is one of mutual adaptation
between citizen activists and party authorities. The party-state initially reacted to Internet activism with
alarm, but has since built a comprehensive approach combining repressive policing with gentler methods
of social management. This approach has evolved in response to the diverse forms of and participants in
Internet activism. But the adaptability of the Chinese Internet control regime does not mean that it will
root out Internet activism. On the contrary, Internet activism will continue to grow and will itself adapt
to the changing forms of control. Comparisons with Russia and the United States highlight how political
economy, history, and everyday practice shape the forms of Internet activism and control.
111143 (2)  Spring 2014
tivism emerged as part of the “polyphony
of conflict and contention” in reform-era
China.1 Its underlying causes are the con-
ditions of social dislocation and polariza-
tion, social injustices, and the rampant
abuse of power among government of -
½cials. New communication technologies
provide a vehicle for Internet activism,
but the root causes of contention are
structural and institutional more than
technological. For this reason, the Chinese
leadership must contain Internet activism
in order to prevent it from aggrandizing
the structural problems. But for the same
reason, government efforts to suppress
Internet activism–aimed as they are at
only expressions of discontent–would
be futile without resolving the deeper
causes. This is the double bind facing the
Chinese regime, and it is in the hopes of
resolving this dilemma that the regime
has in recent years modi½ed its methods
of managing dissent.2
In Chinese of½cial discourse, Internet mass
incidents (wangluo quntixing shijian) refer to
large-scale protest activities that take
place online. Also called Internet incidents
in academic discourse, these contentious
events take place when large numbers of
postings and responses on a social issue
begin to appear and circulate in major on -
line communities, blogs, and microblogs.
The messages typically mix text with dig-
ital photography and sometimes video.
The online expressions are often highly
emotional, with people showing either
great anger or playfulness depending on
the tragic or comic nature of the events.
Mass media and international media cov -
er some of the events, thereby magnifying
their impact.
Although hundreds of Internet protests
occur every year, the main issues focus on
corruption, social injustices against vul-
nerable persons, and abuse of power by
government of½cials.3 Often, people pro -
test because they do not trust of½cial ac -
counts of events, or because government
authorities withhold information. Thus in
a crucial sense, Internet protests are about
politics of transparency and accountability.
The sites of Internet incidents change
with the development of new technolo-
gies. In the 1990s and early 2000s, inci-
dents took place in bulletin board systems
(bbs); they next expanded to blogs; and
½nally moved to microblogs such as Twit -
ter, the equivalent of which is known in
China as Weibo. The most popular Twitter-
like service in China is Sina Weibo. Since
its launch in August 2009, Sina Weibo has
become a favorite venue for both protest
and chitchat. Its clipped 140-character
format and enormous social networks
make it especially hospitable to a kind of
muckraking citizen journalism that is as
entertaining to the consumer public as it
is nettling to censorship-prone propa-
ganda of½cials.
Chinese netizens have developed a rich
culture of using humor, puns, and coded
language to express protest and evade
½ltering software. Harmonizing an online
posting means censoring it. To be invited
to tea by the police means trouble. Grass-
mud horse is not an animal, but the homo-
phone of a curse word. Furthermore, seem -
ingly apolitical issues–such as the sex
diaries of a female blogger, a spoof video
mocking a big-budget but unpopular
½lm, or service blackout in online gaming
communities–could also trigger Internet
incidents. Although these issues attract
attention more for their entertaining
contents than politics, netizens invariably
turn them into political discussion. In
2009, an online community of the popular
computer game World of Warcraft agitat-
ed when its gaming service experienced a
temporary blackout. A cryptic and ap -
parently innocuous phrase–“Jia Junpeng,
your mother wants you to go home to
eat”–went viral in the gaming commu-
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nity, only subsequently to be appropriat-
ed by activists as a political slogan. When
an activist-blogger was later detained by
the police, his sympathizers sent postcards
with the phrase to the police station, peti-
tioning for his release.
There is a growing tendency for online
protests to move offline and into the street.
The environmental protests in Xiamen,
Dalian, Shanghai, and Ningbo in the past
½ve years all involved intense interactions
between online mobilization and offline
protests. And the Southern Weekly protest
in January 2013 is one example of how an
online protest incident can spill out into
the street.4 In these ways, Internet activism
both retains its own distinct features and
merges into the larger trend of popular
contention in contemporary China.
Digital dissidents are among the most
subversive and radical activists in China.
While Internet incidents typically concern
issues that are permissible to the party-
state for some degree of discussion, dissi-
dents express direct political opposition
and call for outright regime change. Dis-
sident blogs and microblogs are shut down
by authorities, while individual dissidents
are closely watched by the state and may
be subject to detention and prosecution. 
Dissidents were some of the earliest
adopters and remain among the most
savvy users of the Internet. In 1997, on the
eve of the eighth anniversary of the 1989
student protest movement, democracy
activists launched what they claimed to
be the ½rst “free magazine” to be edited
in mainland China and distributed by
email. Its inaugural statement encour-
aged readers to forward the e-magazine
to others, stressing the importance of the
new technology for disseminating ideas:
“Free and shining ideas have always
existed. It is a matter of whether they can
be disseminated. The reason why autocrats
could seal our ears and eyes and ½x our
thoughts is that they monopolize the
technology of disseminating information.
Computer networks have changed this
equation.”5
China’s best-known dissidents and
human rights activists are all digitally
savvy. Liu Di, known for her online ID
name Stainless Steel Mouse, published on -
line essays critical of the regime, for which
she was imprisoned for over a year. Upon
release from prison, she wrote an essay
stressing the importance of dispersed on -
line networks to the dissident community.
The dissident qua Nobel Peace Laureate
Liu Xiaobo launched many online peti-
tions focusing on human rights and de -
mocracy before he was arrested and sen-
tenced in 2009. He described the Internet
as a “super-engine” that enabled him to
communicate with the outside world
even while under house arrest.6 Ai Weiwei,
the ultimate media savvy artist-activist,
maintains a highly visible dissident stance
on Twitter, where he conducts his own
campaigns and reports others’ with a style
cultivated to provoke authorities and
arouse his followers.
Because of the Internet, political dissent
has become more transnational and radi-
cal. With little space for political opposi-
tion inside China, dissidents reach over-
seas to plead their cause and seek support
and visibility. Such visibility provides a
measure of protection, which may then
embolden dissidents to take more radical
stances inside China.7 The food safety
activist Zhao Lianhai is a case in point. In
September 2008, two days after his three-
year-old son was diagnosed with kidney
stones due to the consumption of mel -
amine-tainted milk powder, Zhao wrote a
blog calling on families to organize and
½ght for justice. He soon thereafter
launched a campaign website; and after
the site was closed down, he took his pro -
test to Twitter. His Twitter account at -
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tic human rights activists, exiled democ-
racy activists, and journalists from around
the world. Partly in reaction to the re -
pressive state responses he encountered,
and partly because of the moral support
he received on Twitter, Zhao resorted to
more radical language and action, be -
coming engaged in more subversive
issues such as petitioning for the release
of Liu Xiaobo. The transnationalization
of his campaign contributed to his radi-
calization and hastened its repression.
Zhao was arrested and, in November 2010,
sentenced to two-and-a-half years in pris -
on for “disturbing social order.”
L ike digital dissidents, Chinese ngos
and grassroots civic groups were early
adopters of the Internet. But unlike them,
ngos avoid oppositional politics in favor
of a non-confrontational approach to
advocacy and civic engagement. For them,
the Internet is a platform for organizing
activities, networking, and publicity. 
A survey of 129 ngos that I conducted
in 2003 found that 106 of them were con-
nected to the Internet and 69 had web-
sites. Because of their lack of resources,
small grassroots groups use the Internet
more actively than resource-rich organi-
zations.8 This earlier, rudimentarily wired
ngo community became more thickly
networked in the age of social media. A
2009 survey found wide adoption of
Web2.0 technologies among the 327 civil
society organizations studied: over 84
percent of them use instant messaging;
70 percent have uploaded video, audio, or
images online; 56 percent use online
forums and bulletin boards; and 44 percent
use blogs.9
Microblogging is the new favorite plat-
form for ngo advocacy. Among the doz -
ens of ngos and ngo activists I follow
on Sina Weibo, environmental and charity
ngos are the most active, using Weibo to
push aggressively for environmental infor -
mation disclosure. Beijing environmental
activist Chen Liwen’s dogged efforts, com -
bining legal action with online publicity
to push for information disclosure about
a solid waste incinerator project in Guang -
zhou, is one such successful case.10
Another popular activity on Weibo is
public interest (gongyi) activism, such as so -
cial support and charity activities spon-
sored by ngos or individual activists. In
April 2011, the well-known journalist Deng
Fei launched a “Free Lunch for Children”
program by mobilizing his 1.4 million fol-
lowers on Sina Weibo. The program
gained widespread support and raised $4
million in eight months.11
Contributing to this wave of online
public interest activism is citizens’ grow-
ing distrust of of½cial charity organiza-
tions like the Chinese Red Cross Society,
which was thrown into a serious credibility
crisis in 2011 because of its lack of trans-
parency.12 On his Sina blog, Feng Yong -
feng, director of the environmental ngo
Nature University, argues that transparen-
cy is all important to ngos. He believes
that microblogging is a perfect tool for
transparency and thus indispensable to
ngo activism. In his own words, “If an
ngo is transparent enough, its work must
be microblogged and its microblog must
be a way of doing its work.”13
Online communities are a common
feature of contemporary Internet culture
worldwide. They exist in all types of net-
work services, from Twitter to Facebook
to Chinese Weibo. Not all online commu-
nities are civic, but those that do engage
in civic activism may be called online
civic communities. Examples of such in -
clude reading groups and ½lm and music
fan clubs on douban.com, and the web-
sites of lgbt activists, hepatitis-B carriers,
migrant workers, and other marginalized
groups. Unlike ngos, which are organized
groups with a mission and a leadership
Guobin
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structure, these communities are loose
networks of people with shared interests
and identities. Activism within these com -
munities is random and incidental, typi-
cally emerging from member interactions.
Like ngo advocacy, community activism
is moderate and non-confrontational.
Though most of these communities re -
main strictly online, they do sometimes
sprout out into the physical world as non-
pro½t organizations or business entities.
Take, for example, the online community
aibai.com. In 1999, two gay men started
the website gaychinese.net, which quickly
attracted users. The site later switched to
its current name of aibai.com, an acro -
nym referring to an original open letter
published online, “White Paper on Our
Love.” The website is today the most pop -
 ular lgbt portal in the Chinese-language
world, and in 2006, it established a non-
pro½t organization in Beijing called Aibai
Culture and Education Center, which
remains active.
Gandan Xiangzhao (gdxz), an online
com munity of hepatitis-B carriers, is an -
other online activist community that
spawned an af½liated ngo. Launched in
2001 as a bbs forum, gdxz served as an
alternative social space for a marginalized
group. In 2003, forum members launched
public campaigns and lawsuits concern-
ing cases of job discrimination. The sup-
port of forum members was instrumen-
tal in a prominent case in Anhui, where a
young man with hepatitis-Bwon a lawsuit
against the local government. This even-
tually led to new government policies
prohibiting discrimination against hepa-
titis-B carriers in job recruitment.14 The
community’s websites have repeatedly
been shut down, yet each time gdxz has
managed to reopen the site, which contin-
ues to thrive today. In 2006, a key mem-
ber of the community started a nonpro½t
organization to sustain the community’s
anti-discrimination movement.
How does the Chinese party-state re -
spond to the diverse forms of and partici-
pants in Internet activism? Censorship in
China is not a static and monolithic system
aimed at complete control of the Inter-
net. On the contrary, the Chinese Internet
censorship regime changes in response to
the evolving forms of Internet activism.
This process is characterized by the ex -
pansion of management institutions, the
differentiation of targets of control, and
the innovation of management methods.
The of½cial institutions of the censor-
ship regime consist of party propaganda
departments and government agencies, as
well as laws and regulations. The highest-
level party agency charged to manage me -
dia is the Department of Propaganda.
Various ministries under the State Coun-
cil regulate contents and services through
administrative regulations and licensing.
Lower-level governments, meanwhile,
may issue local regulations targeting their
own constituencies. For example, in 2011,
several departments in the Beijing mu -
nicipal government jointly issued a regu-
lation requiring microblog service pro -
viders in Beijing to verify personal iden-
ti½cation when a user attempts to register
an account. 
The strategy of mobilizing ngos and
Internet content providers (icps) to curtail
the online information flow is one exam-
ple of adaptability in the regime’s Internet
control efforts. This strategy is also con-
sistent with the regime’s tradition of rely-
ing on “mass organizations” for policy im -
plementation.15 The main ngo in this area
is the Internet Society of China (isc). A na -
tional-level industrial association founded
in May 2001 by leading network access car -
riers, Internet service providers (isps), and
research institutions, isc has thousands
of subsidiary associations and societies at
the provincial, municipal, and county lev-
els. These organizations concen trate their
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The meaning of self-regulation differs
by regulatory context.16 In China, the em -
phasis has been on self-regulation by the
industries, and on Internet ½rms’ respon-
sibility to monitor and remove harmful
information from their websites. Chi-
nese icps have long engaged in censor-
ship; in the 1990s and early 2000s, when
bbs were the most popular forms of
online communities, most bbs forum
managers were volunteers selected from
regular Internet users. Today, major web
portals hire large teams of full-time edi-
tors who use both ½ltering software and
manual labor to monitor their websites.
In 2010, when I interviewed the manager
of a popular online community in Bei-
jing, she told me that the ½rm had a team
of thirty editors monitoring the contents
on its website. Sina Weibo censors its
postings routinely17–although, according
to its own chief editor, “controlling con-
tent on Sina Weibo is a big headache,”18
which explains the need to differentiate
targets and innovate methods.
Government authorities view Internet
protest as a threat to domestic social sta-
bility, national security, and the credibility
of law enforcement authorities and gov-
ernment. Describing Internet mass inci-
dents, one deputy chief of a provincial
police department stressed their dramat-
ically increasing numbers, complicated
and multiple types, enormous mobilizing
power, penetration by domestic and for-
eign hostile forces, and serious damage to
stability.19
It is not surprising, then, that the areas
and sites of regulation and control have
expanded. Initially, the main targets of
regulation were electronic bbs and Inter-
net cafes, with regulations for the admin-
istration of each promulgated in 2000 and
2001, respectively. Today, content and ser -
vice regulation is all-encompassing, cov-
ering Internet cafés, bbs, text messaging,
online news, video and audio sharing web -
sites, online games, and blogs and micro -
blogs. 
At the same time, the authorities try to
differentiate targets and issues. One study
has found that censorship is likely to tar-
get Internet postings that call for collective
action, but not postings that merely criti-
cize the government.20 The growing fre-
quency of Internet incidents concerning
corrupt of½cials, vulnerable individuals,
and environmental protection indicates
an increase in the number of incidents, as
well as more government toleration of
public discussion of these issues. To some
extent, the Chinese leadership has ac -
knowledged the legitimacy of online pub-
lic opinion. Since July 2009, the Media
Opinion Monitoring Of½ce of People’s
Daily Online has published quarterly re -
ports on local governments’ capacity to
respond to Internet mass incidents. The
website of the Xinhua News Agency has
an active section on public opinion with
daily and weekly news releases of viral
Internet postings on various types of so -
cial issues.21
Chinese authorities can be more or less
tolerant of Internet protests depending on
the particular issues brought into focus.
In contrast, digital dissidents are key tar-
gets of censorship and repression. Such
was the case in early 2011 when, following
anonymous Internet calls for a Chinese
“jasmine revolution,” police detained or
arrested notable bloggers and human
rights lawyers in an effort to preempt mo -
bilization.22
Compared with dissident communities,
ngos and online civic communities en -
joy considerable leeway. While hoping to
gain more public recognition, many online
communities (such as in the lgbt com-
munity) remain largely alternative spaces
of social support and solidarity. ngos use
social media to advocate public causes
passionately, but rarely, if ever, do they
Guobin
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challenge the regime in the process. They
seek social change by working with, rath -
er than against, the government.23
Early government responses to Internet
activism were reactive, panicked, and often
heavy-handed; forced closure of well-
known websites and detention of digital
activists were not uncommon. Yitahutu,
a popular bbs forum based in Peking
University, was closed down in 2004,
while another well-known website, Yan-
nan Web, was closed in 2005. A 2004 Am -
nesty International report lists the names
of ½fty-four people who were detained or
imprisoned for using the Internet in
China.24
But in recent years, the emphasis has
shifted to methods of “administration”
and soft control. The 2010 white paper
“The Internet in China” spells out the key
elements of the new model, which is
comprised of “laws and regulations, ad -
ministrative supervision, self-regulation,
technical protection, public supervision
and social education.”25 These methods
aim both to censor and to channel con-
tent. In 2010, a local public security de -
partment in Fujian province published a
study about how it had innovated methods
for social management. The report states: 
The management of virtual society com-
bines damming with channeling, with more
emphasis on channeling. . . . The municipal
public security bureau of Jian’ou set up an
[I]nternet opinion and monitoring leader-
ship group and of½ce. . . . Instead of simply
blocking, ½ltering and deleting postings
involving police, they ½nd the people who
post the messages and explain to them the
harms and bene½ts, so they will voluntarily
delete or modify their postings.26
The new model also aims to reduce the
threat of Internet activism by enhancing
the online influence of of½cial media in -
stitutions, and by promoting corporate
social responsibility among Internet ½rms
and ethical conduct among Internet users.
To achieve these goals, hidden methods
are combined with public campaigns. Gov -
ernment-hired Internet commentators,
with the pejorative nickname of wumao
(“50-cent party”–named for the sup-
posed state payout per successful post),
are a hidden form of control. These com-
mentators are employees or volunteers
recruited by government agencies to par-
ticipate anonymously in online discussion
and publish views that either support state
agendas or help defuse anti-party senti-
ment. Since its introduction in 2005, this
practice has been adopted widely by local
governments.27
In addition to covert means of shaping
online public opinion, state and local gov -
ernments employ many overt practices.
Public campaigns, a distinct feature of
Chinese politics in the Maoist era, con-
tinue to be used in modi½ed forms.28 The
anti-vulgarity “special action” launched in
January 2009 was a coordinated national
campaign “to contain the wide spreading
of vulgar contents online, further purify
the cultural environment on the Internet,
protect the healthy growth of the under-
aged, and promote the healthy and orderly
development of the Internet.”29 On the
day of its launch, the China Internet Illegal
Information Reporting Center (ciirc)–
established in 2004 under the sponsor-
ship of the Internet Society of China–
publicized the names of nineteen websites
allegedly containing “vulgar contents.”
These websites included practically all the
leading commercial sites: Google, Baidu,
Sina, Sohu, Tencent, Netease, Mop, and
Tianya. The ciirc requested that these
websites remove the offending contents,
and in response, by February 24, 2009, a
total of 2,962 websites had been closed.30
Opening government accounts on pop-
ular microblog platforms has been another
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In September 2011, the Ministry of Public
Security held a national conference to
promote the use of microblogs by public
security agencies. There were at that time
more than four thousand of½cial micro -
blog accounts and ½ve thousand individual
police of½cer accounts.31 One of½cer’s mi -
cro blog account, registered as “A Legend -
ary Cyber-Policewoman” on Sina Weibo,
had 2.1 million followers as of January 27,
2014. Employed by the Department of
Public Security in Beijing, this cyber-
policewoman posts regularly on all sorts
of topics, from daily chitchat to advice on
network security to reports of weather
and traf½c conditions. A photograph of
her in police uniform smiling at the view-
er conveys the image of a friendly police
of½cer keeping watch, ready to offer help.
Reminiscent of, yet somewhat different
from, the soldier role model Lei Feng in
the Maoist era, the legendary cyber-
policewoman on Weibo represents the
digital extension and creative reinvention
of what Elizabeth Perry has called “a tra-
dition of cultural governance.” This tra-
dition reaches deep into Chinese political
culture, from imperial Confucian rituals to
the Chinese Communist Party.32
Since Xi Jinping became China’s Com-
munist Party leader in November 2012, the
tradition of cultural governance has en -
joyed a resurgence. Called “more Maoist
than reformer” by the Los Angeles Times,33
Xi has reportedly encouraged adopting
self-criticism as a means of curbing cor-
ruption.34 Similarly, Maoist practices
have been extended to the management
of the Internet. For example, during the
crackdown on “Internet rumors” in the
summer of 2013, the popular blogger Xue
Manzi was detained on charges of soliciting
prostitution. He was then shown on na -
tional television networks confessing his
wrongdoing of spreading irresponsible in -
formation on his Sina Weibo account. Such
Cultural Revolution-style public shaming
sent a clear warning to Chinese Internet
users about the limits of online speech.
Internet activism is not unique to China,
nor are government efforts to monitor
and contain it. Wherever the Internet has
developed, citizens embrace it for protest
and resistance while state powers attempt
to control it. Yet in different countries and
regions of the world, the speci½c forms of
Internet activism and control vary. In the
United States, purely or primarily online
protests have taken place before and re -
main a component of contemporary social
movements. Examples include varieties
of electronic civic disobedience ½rst ar -
ticulated by the Critical Art Ensemble, the
various Indymedia projects that were born
with the Seattle wto protests in 1999,
and online signature petitions and cam-
paign websites such as the influential
MoveOn.org. 
A distinct feature of online activism in
the United States, however, is institution-
alization. Since the radical protests of the
1960s, social movements in Western in -
dustrial nations have become institution-
alized, characterized by the bureaucrati-
zation of social movement organizations
and the routinization, rather than the
radicalization, of claims-making activi-
ties.35 Money, membership, and other re -
sources have become crucial to the sur-
vival of bureaucratized organizations. The
Internet developed in the United States
alongside a ½rmly established civil socie-
ty, and use of new media technologies by
online activist organizations is therefore
embedded in a rich tradition of the oper-
ations of large membership-based non-
pro½t organizations. And so we see that
like other social movement organiza-
tions or interest groups in the United
States, even an online organization like
MoveOn.org is membership-based. 
Thus, more often than not, the Internet
is treated merely as a new tool for carrying
Guobin
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out routine activities (such as fundraising)
for preexisting civic associations. Spon-
taneous and unorganized forms of online
action of the kind known as Internet mass
incidents in China are not only uncom-
mon, but may be viewed with suspicion.
For example, the unorganized but collec-
tive efforts in 4Chan and Reddit online
communities to search for the Boston
bombing suspects after April 15, 2013–a
kind of online collective action not unlike
the online exposure of corrupt govern-
ment of½cials in China–was met with
public criticism and cries of vigilantism. 
Russia, on the other hand, does have its
share of Internet mass incidents,36 rang-
ing from Internal Affairs Directorate
Major Aleksei Dymovsky’s 2009 YouTube
whistleblowing on corrupt Russian law
enforcement of½cials and practices37 to the
2012 music videos of the political protest
group Pussy Riot. The pattern of infor-
mation dissemination in the Dymovsky
case is remarkably similar to events in
China, starting with the posting of a video,
followed by a large number of online
viewers responding, before ½nally receiv-
ing coverage from the mass media. 
But otherwise, Internet activism in Rus-
sia is more organized than in China, and
thus more closely resembles the U.S.
model. To protest against the allegedly
“unfair” parliamentary and presidential
elections of 2011 and 2012, activists and
leaders of oppositional parties organized
an alternative online election to create a
representative body to push for funda-
mental changes to the political system.38
In a sopa (Stop Online Piracy Act)-style
protest on August 1, 2013, one thousand
seven hundred websites in Russia went
dark to protest a new anti-piracy law that
enabled the Russian government to black -
list Internet resources without issuing a
court order.39 China had its own sopa
moment in 2009, when the Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology was
on the verge of requiring all personal com -
puters sold in mainland China to have
installed a ½ltering software called Green
Dam-Youth Escort. Yet the protest was not
the coordinated blackening of websites,
but took the form of spontaneous verbal
protests in online communities in the
typical style of an Internet mass incident.
As my discussion of Chinese ngo ad -
vocacy shows, civic organizing is on the
rise in China; but there are clear political
limits, and ngos tend to avoid radical,
confrontational methods. The more or -
ganized nature of Internet activism in
Russia is due partly to a more open political
environment. In Russia, as in the United
States, there are “opposition parties” that
can regularly organize activism and pro -
test, whereas the formation of indepen -
dent political parties in China is out of the
question. 
Another difference between Internet ac -
tivism in China and that in Russia and the
United States centers on Internet plat-
forms. Videos and animations are used for
protest in China, but they are posted on
local Chinese platforms rather than on
You Tube, which like Twitter and Facebook,
is blocked within China. The most popular
platforms for protest in China have always
been large online communities run by
com mercial websites. Integrating news,
blogs, microblogs, bbs forums, as well as
video sites, gaming, music, and literature,
these communities are highly interactive
spaces. In this respect, Chinese online plat -
forms resemble the Russian blogosphere
more than the American. In teractive func -
tions, such as the “friends list” on LiveJour-
nal, are just as common on Chinese blog
sites. And China’s micro blogging websites
allow users to post vi deos, images, and long
messages when they retweet or comment
on other users’ postings–functions not
currently available on Twitter.
Internet censorship as practiced in Chi -
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ing websites, and requiring online forums
to monitor and censor postings, is not
known in the United States or Russia. But
this does not suggest the total absence of
surveillance or policing of protest activi-
ties in these countries. Sociologists have
long studied the policing of protest in
West ern democracies. In the United States,
activists’ reports and scholarly research
have revealed aggressive and sophisticated
surveillance of, for example, Occupy Wall
Street (ows) activists by the nypd, and
there were also instances of Twitter cen-
soring the ows hashtag.40 While web-
sites in Russia are generally not ½ltered or
censored, Russian authorities do use law
to restrict illegal content, and they resort
to extralegal or covert practices to limit
information flow.41
Beyond these crucial differences among
the three nations, there are some intriguing
converging trends in state surveillance. So -
ciologist Patrick Gillham has found that
com pared with protest policing in earlier
pe riods, the policing during ows empha-
sized the control of public spaces, high-tech
surveillance, the management of informa-
tion and intelligence about ac tivists, and
the proactive shaping of the production of
public information. These new features sig -
nal the emergence of a new mode of pro -
test policing that centers on the use of sur -
veillance and intelligence to manage risks
and incapacitate potential offenders. Signs
of this approach also ap peared in the Chi-
nese police crackdown on the abortive jas -
mine revolution in February 2011, when
the censorship and surveillance of the In -
ternet tightened, and surveillance vehicles
and police of½cers, armed with digital cam -
eras and communication technologies,
showed up at the planned venues in Beijing
and Shanghai to forestall street protests.
Analysts have also found the revival of
the use of Mao-style grassroots infor -
mants for collecting information about dis -
sidents and potential protest activities.42
Like its Chinese counterpart, the Russian
regime uses proactive methods to control
information and boost its own political
messages. Russia reportedly started using
paid pro-government bloggers to guide
online information in 2005.43 This practice
is reminiscent of the use of anonymous
Internet commentators (the 50-cent party)
to guide online public opinion in China, a
practice that also began in 2005.
To a considerable extent, with respect to
Internet activism and control, the differ-
ences among China, the United States, and
Russia can be explained by their different
political economies. Russia is often con-
sidered a hybrid regime with a nominally
democratic system.44 It is therefore not
surprising that Russia falls somewhere be -
tween China and the United States, with
signi½cantly more political spaces for
activism than China. Although China is an
authoritarian state, its economy is capi-
talistic, a peculiar combination often des-
ignated as state capitalism. For Internet
activism and control, this means that al -
though the government seeks to suppress
undesirable content, it cannot afford to
destroy its Internet economy by forbid-
ding people to talk online. For their part,
Internet ½rms, caught between govern-
ment censorship regulations and business
aspirations, promote their businesses by
creating mechanisms for encouraging
user interaction while gingerly walking the
censorship line. Some of the peculiar, in -
teractive features of Chinese blog and mi -
croblog websites result from these nego-
tiations.
Yet political economy cannot fully ex -
plain the speci½c features of Internet pol-
itics. Equally important are the nations’
po litical cultures and histories, and the
every day practices of regular Internet
users. Thus, the institutionalization of
Internet activism in the United States re -
flects the organized nature of American
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social movements in general. And how-
ever much Russia and China may differ in
their approaches to containing Internet
dissent and activism, they share one crucial
similarity: a political tradition of media
control and a government “bent on cen -
tralization and rife with controlling
impulses.”45 The method of using the
Internet to promote government messages
in Russia and China derives from a shared
history of state propaganda. 
The ways in which a new technology is
used or contested depend on preexisting
conventions and current practices. The
formation of a Chinese-style Internet ac -
tivism, including Internet mass incidents
and the penchant for using coded lan-
guage, is shaped by both China’s political
context and users’ practices and habits in
their daily production, circulation, and
con sumption of online content. These
practices combine elements of existing
forms with creative adaptations of old
forms or new inventions. Thus, when web -
sites began to offer electronic bbs, they
naturally became a forum for users to air
grievances and to protest. For many In -
ternet users, these postings were like elec -
tronic versions of big-character wall post -
ers, a time-tested form of public expres-
sion in modern Chinese history. 
The Chinese party-state continually
modi½es its policies and methods of con-
taining Internet activism. No longer trying
to eradicate online protest, it has shifted
to managing and co-opting it, in the hopes
of channeling it to its own advantage. As
scholars of Chinese politics have shown,
this regime adaptability is not new, but is
part of a long history of political flexibil-
ity.46 Of course, China’s history of popular
protest is equally rich. And now this en -
tangled history of mutual adaptation, of
continuity and change, is unfolding in the
digital realm.
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